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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960665-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8 (a) (2) (i) , in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Judge J. Dennis Frederick presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred on

this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
I.

Whether the stop of Appellant's car was illegal from its

inception due to a lack of reasonable suspicion in violation of
Appellant's constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure.
Standard of Review.

"[T]he proper standard of review to be

applied to a trial court determination of whether a specific set
of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of
law and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness. . . [T] he
reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a measure

of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a
given set of facts. . .

. O n the other hand, a sufficiently

careful review is necessary to assure that the purposes of the
reasonable-suspicion requirement are served."

State v. Pena, 869

P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); see also State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d
972, 973 (Utah App. 1988) ("Because a determination of the
constitutionality of a police officer's stop of a person under
the fourth amendment turns upon the facts of each case, we review
the facts in detail")(citation omitted).
II.

Whether the court below erred in admitting at the

preliminary hearing a toxicology report prepared by the state
crime lab where such report does not fit within any recognized
hearsay exception, and is otherwise lacking foundation, in
violation of Appellant's constitutional right of confrontation
and his statutory right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at a
preliminary proceeding as secured by the rules of evidence and
criminal procedure.
Standard of Review:

"Whether a piece of evidence is

admissible is a question of law, and we always review questions
of law under a correctness standard."

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d

774, 789 n.3 (Utah 1991).
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant's Motion to Quash Bindover based on lack of
reasonable suspicion and inadmissible hearsay evidence, and
Appellant's Motion to Suppress based on lack of reasonable
suspicion, are preserved in the Record on Appeal ("R.") at 24-45,
2

75-76.

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to

Rule 11 (i), Utah R. Crim. P., and State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935
(Utah App. 1988), which are preserved at R.93-94.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions
will be determinative of the issue on appeal:
Amendment IV, United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .
Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; . . . .
Article I, Section 13, Utah Constitution:
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the
examination be waived by the accused with the consent
of the State . . . .
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against
him . . . Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to
a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists . . . Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause .
Rule 803(6), Utah Rules of Evidence:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in
any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
3

activity, and if it was the regular practice of the
business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness,
unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
Rule 803(8)(B), Utah Rules of Evidence:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth
. . . (B) matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed
by law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed
by police officers and other law enforcement personnel
Rule 1101(b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence:
The rules [of evidence] . . . do not apply in the
following situations: . . . (5) in a preliminary
examination, nothing in these rules shall be construed
to prevent the admission of reliable hearsay evidence.
Rule 7(h)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules
and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a
court. The state has the burden of proof and shall
proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the
state's case, the defendant . . . may [] cross-examine
adverse witnesses.
Rule 7(h)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
If from the evidences a magistrate finds probable cause
to believe that the crime charged has been committed
and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate
shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound
over to answer in the district court. The findings of
probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in
part....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings,
and Disposition in the Court Below.
On May 20, 1996, the State of Utah charged Appellant Nelson
Rodriguez-Lopi ("Rodriguez") with one count of unlawful
4

possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1996), one count of
carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. 76-10-505 (1995), and one count of
transporting an open container, a class C misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44.20 (1993), and served him
with an arrest warrant.

R. 5-6, 8-10.

At the preliminary hearing, the State submitted the
testimony of police officers and a toxicology report prepared by
the Utah Crime Lab alleging that the substance found on
Rodriguez's person was cocaine.

R.47-78.

Rodriguez challenged

the admission of the toxicology report as inadmissible hearsay
lacking foundation.

R.50-52, 68-71.

The magistrate held the

report admissible and bound the case over to the Third Judicial
District Court based on the findings contained in the report plus
the testimony of the arresting officers.

R.72.

In a Motions Proceeding in the Third Judicial District Court
before Judge J. Dennis Frederick, Rodriguez again challenged the
admission of the toxicology report by filing a Motion to Quash
Bindover.

R.24-45.

In the Motion, Rodriguez asserted that the

State could not establish the corpus delicti given that the
toxicology report, the only competent evidence establishing the
corpus delicti of the crime, was inadmissible hearsay under Utah
Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 803(8) (B).

R.30-36.

Rodriguez also

challenged the report for lack of foundation, R. 39-45, and as a
violation of his rights of confrontation and cross-examination.
5

R. 36-39.
Rodriguez further challenged the stop of his vehicle in a
Motion to Suppress Evidence on the grounds that the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion.

R.75-76.

In a Motion to Suppress

Defendant's Statements, Rodriguez challenged the admission of an
incriminating statement made while under arrest in violation of
his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

R.22.

Rodriguez also filed a Motion to

Suppress Evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search of his car
and his person.

R.77-78.

The trial court granted his motion to

suppress his statement, but denied all other motions.

R.125.

Thereafter, the parties entered into a plea agreement
wherein Rodriguez pled guilty to one count of possession of a
controlled substance.

R.93-94.

The parties specifically

conditioned the plea upon Rodriguez's right to appeal the
dismissed motion to quash the bindover based on the admission of
the toxicology report, the stop of his vehicle, and the admission
of evidence seized thereafter, pursuant to Rule 11 (i) , Utah R.
Crim. P., and State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).
R.93-94.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of May 19, 1996, at approximately five a.m.,
Appellant Nelson Rodriguez-Lopi ("Rodriguez") was driving his
truck between fifteenth and sixteenth south in the northbound,
outside lane of State Street in Salt Lake City. R. 159.
6

A friend

of Rodriguez was riding in the passenger seat.

Id.

Two police officers, Officer Farris ("Farris") and Officer
Schow ("Schow"), were driving a marked police car in the same
direction and the same lane several car lengths behind Rodriguez.
Both officers observed Rodriguez driving unusually close to the
gutter at approximately ten miles per hour while passing two
women walking on the sidewalk.

R. 161, 176.

The truck did not

stop moving at any point, and remained on the paved road at all
times.

R. 166, 168, 183.

There were no signs indicating the

legal speed limit in that area, nor parking meters or markings
indicating that the part of the road upon which Rodriguez drove
was reserved exclusively for parking.

R. 166, 167.

The officers also observed the passenger stick his head out
the window as the truck passed the women, but did not hear the
conversation among them.

R. 161, 182. Officer Farris had second-

hand knowledge that the women were prostitutes, but did not have
personal knowledge of such information.

R. 168.

was not acquainted with the women at all.

Officer Schow

R. 176.

Based on the fact that Rodriguez was driving close to the
curb at a slow speed, and the fact that the passenger was leaning
out the window to speak to two women whom Farris had heard were
prostitutes, the officers decided to pull Rodriguez over.
160, 161.

R.

The record does not indicate any specific statutory

violation upon which the officers justified their stop of
Rodriguez's vehicle.
Rodriguez continued to drive for more than a city block
7

before stopping, (R. 161, 176), during which time the officers
observed both men reaching under the seat.

Id.

Once the car

stopped, Schow approached the driver side window and Farris
approached the passenger window.

R. 161. Based on a suspicion

that the men were concealing contraband when observed reaching
under the seat, Schow ordered both men out of the car and
instructed them to stand at the rear of the truck.

R. 177, 185.

Farris looked into the truck and initially viewed an open
bottle of beer in the middle of the floorboard, and then, as he
moved to the front of the truck, he spied a pistol lying on the
floor underneath the driver's seat.

R. 162.

Farris yelled "gun"

to notify Schow and Officers Findlay ("Findlay") and Housley, who
had arrived on the scene as backup in the interim.

R. 162, 185.

Farris approached Rodriguez and told him to turn around and
put his hands up.

R. 163, 185. Rodriguez hesitated so Farris

took him to the ground and handcuffed him.

R. 163, 186.

At that

point, Findlay, who was standing next to Farris and Rodriguez,
noticed a baggie containing a white powdery substance partially
sticking out of Rodriguez's shirt pocket.
picked it up and inquired, "what is this?".

R. 186.

Findlay

R. 187.

There is a

discrepancy among the officers' testimony as to Rodriguez's exact
response, varying from "coca" to "cocaina" and "cocanini".
Nonetheless, all officers understood Rodriguez to mean cocaine.
R. 179, 187.
The officers stipulate that Rodriguez was under full arrest
at the moment he was placed in handcuffs.
8

R. 171, 188.

However,

Findlay did not Mirandize Rodriguez prior to questioning him
about the contents of the baggie.

R. 189.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The stop of Rodriguez's automobile was not premised upon
reasonable suspicion and, therefore, the evidence seized as a
result of the illegal stop is inadmissible.

The arresting

officers did not state a specific traffic violation which led
them to stop Rodriguez.

Moreover, the reasons offered by the

arresting officers, namely that Rodriguez was driving close to
the curb at a slow speed while passing two women, do not give
rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot such that the stop was appropriate in this
case.

Consequently, the trial court erred in denying Rodriguez's

Motion to Suppress evidence seized pursuant to the illegal stop.
In addition to the erroneous admission of illegally seized
evidence, the district court erred in admitting a toxicology
report offered by the State Crime Lab at Rodriguez's preliminary
hearing since the report constituted unreliable hearsay under the
rules of evidence.

Specifically, the State did not present any

evidence establishing its foundation, and case law otherwise
prohibits the use of scientific police reports under the business
records exception to the rules of evidence and excludes it as a
police report under the public records exception.

The admission

of the toxicology report violated Rodriguez's constitutional
right of confrontation and his statutory right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses at the preliminary proceeding.
9

Consequently,

the district court committed reversible constitutional and
prejudicial error.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Stop of Rodriguez's Car Was Not Premised Upon a
Reasonable Suspicion From Its Inception And Thus All
Evidence Seized As A Result Of the Illegal Stop Is
Inadmissible.

The stop of Rodriguez's car was illegal from its inception
since the circumstances surrounding the stop did not give rise to
a reasonable suspicion such that an investigative stop was
constitutional.

See Amend. IV, United States Const.; Article I,

§ 14, Utah Const.

Subsequently, the seizure of evidence as a

result of the initial encounter is inadmissible under the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine, and the conviction should be
reversed.

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88,

83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.ed.2d 441 (1963).
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127
(Utah 1991), stated that

n/

stopping an automobile and detaining

its occupants constitute[s] a seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."

Id. at 1131 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse f 440

U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)).

A traffic

stop, therefore, must satisfy the two requirements governing
investigative stops set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88
S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (I960), namely that the stop is
justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion at its inception
and that it is "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
justifying the stop in the first place."

Lopez at 1132 (quoting

Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20); see also 77-7-15 (1996)(codifying the
10

constitutionally mandated standard for investigative stops).

If

an investigative stop does not meet these requirements, then all
evidence seized pursuant thereto is inadmissible as a fruit of
the poisonous tree.

See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88.

As to reasonable suspicion, the critical inquiry in this
case, the Lopez Court delineated two possible situations where a
stop would be justified.

First, "a police officer is

constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is
'incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers'
presence.'"

Id. (quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491

(Utah App. 1990)).

Second, a stop may be justified in the

absence of an observed violation where the officer has "a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a
traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol,
. . . [or a] more serious criminal activity."

Id.

This

determination may be considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances, (see State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App.
1988)) and the officers' experience.

See State v. Holmes, 774

P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989).
The stop at issue in this case does not fall within either
of the categories where reasonable suspicion exists to stop a
vehicle.

First, the State does not establish in the record what,

if any, violation occurred to justify the stop.
officers' testimony indicate this information.

Nor does the
Farris alludes to

a possible drunk driving or solicitation violation based on the
slow rate of speed, closeness to the curb, and the fact that the
11

passenger leaned out the window as the truck rolled by two women
whom he knew second hand to be prostitutes.

However, none of

these actions constitute infractions of the law1 and, hence, do
not justify the stop based on an observed violation under Lopez.
873 P.2d at 1132.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the stop do not give
rise to a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation or
criminal activity was afoot.

Rather, the speculative reasons

proffered by Farris in justification of his stop of Rodriguez
were mere hunches that do not pass constitutional muster.

See

State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1994)("'anything
less [than reasonable, articulable suspicion] would invite
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this
Court has consistently refused to sanction'")(quoting State v.
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987); citing Terry, 392

1

The most plausible traffic violation that Rodriguez could
be cited for is for failing to drive "as nearly as practical
entirely within a single lane." Utah Code Ann. 41-6-61(1) (1996) .
However, Rodriguez was driving on the paved portion of the road at
all times, and the area did not bear any markings indicating the
dividing line between the driving lane and the "parking area"
referred to by Farris in his testimony such that Rodriguez would
have been on notice of the violation, if any.
The crime of solicitation could not be charged against the
passenger in Rodriguez's car since that offense is not complete
until a bargain has been made to engage in a sexual activity. See
Utah Code Ann. 76-10-1302 (1996) . Given that neither officer knew
first hand that the women were prostitutes, that the vehicle never
came to a full stop, that only seconds passed as the officers
observed the passenger stick his head out the window as the truck
rolled by the women, and that the officers did not hear any of the
conversation between the passenger and the women, the officers
could not cite Rodriguez or the passenger for solicitation.
12

U.S. at 21-22) .
Moreover, each of the reasons Farris cites in support of the
stop have been rejected by Utah Courts as bases of reasonable
suspicion.

Specifically, Farris cites Rodriguez's slowness,

position in the lane, and the passenger's leaning out of the
window as the truck passed by the two women as reasons for
effectuating the stop.
As to Rodriguez's slow driving, Utah Courts have held in
factually similar cases that slow driving does not amount to
reasonable suspicion.

See Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011

(Utah App. 1989); State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986).
For example, the Utah Supreme Court in Carpena held that an
officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to pull
over a motorist with out-of-state plates who was driving slowly
through a residential area at 3:00 a.m.

Id. at 674.

Likewise,

in Thorsness, this Court held that an officer lacked reasonable
suspicion of drunk driving to stop a defendant who stopped to
look at an officer helping a stranded motorist by the side of the
road at 1:30 a.m., then begrudgingly moved on at half the posted
speed at the officer's request.

This Court noted that absent

"reckless, erratic driving patterns [] indicat[ing] a lack of
vehicle control, . . . [such] facts are equally indicative of
innocent behavior and, without more, do not provide a reasonable
basis to suspect defendant of being intoxicated."
P.2d at 1101.

Thorsness, 778

Given that Farris expressly premised the stop on

the fact that he "suspected that the drive[r] [sic] may be
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drunk," (R.161), the trial court below erred in finding that
Farris and Schow had reasonable suspicion in light of Utah case
law which rejects slow driving as an indication of drunk driving.
As in Thorsness, the facts of the present case do not evince a
"lack of vehicle control" which would justify the stop.
Thorsness, 778 P.2d at 1101.
Even when considered in connection with Rodriguez's
closeness to the curb, the officer could not reasonably infer
that Rodriguez was not in control of the car.

Rodriguez was not

weaving, he maintained a constant speed and course, he remained
on the paved road, and he was not blocking traffic nor
endangering pedestrians.

The mere fact of driving slow to the

right of the lane does not adequately establish the
constitutionally mandated level of reasonable suspicion.
As to Farris hunch of solicitation, the circumstances
surrounding these events likewise do not establish reasonable
suspicion in justification of the stop.

Instructive on this

issue is this Court's opinion in State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506
(Utah App. 1989), and the opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in U.S. v. Bvrd, 47 F.3d 1170 (C.A.6 1995).

In both

cases, the respective fact patterns, as compared with the
distinctive facts of the instant case, highlight when reasonable
suspicion of solicitation legitimately arises.
In Holmes, this Court found reasonable suspicion of
solicitation to exist where officers with a combined total of
thirty-four years of vice experience initially observed a woman
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standing on the sidewalk talking to a man in a car, then watched
her as she began to stroll up the street, turning back
occasionally to check the traffic, and ultimately saw her have
brief conversations with male drivers of two other vehicles, and
get into the second car.

Consequently, the officers were

justified in conducting an investigative stop of the car that the
woman entered.

Holmes, 774 P.2d at 507.

In Byrd, the United

States Court of Appeals found that reasonable suspicion existed
only where an officer noticed defendant's car parked in the
middle of the road, and observed a known prostitute whom the
officer had earlier told to get off the street leaning into the
passenger side talking to the driver.

Byrd, 47 F.3d at 1170.

The present case is distinguishable from Holmes and Byrd in
many significant respects.

First, Rodriguez never stopped as the

truck passed the women, unlike the vehicles in the other cases.
R.183.

In fact, the truck rapidly overtook the women who were

walking in the same direction but at a much slower pace.

Id.

Second, Farris and Schow merely observed the passenger stick
his head out of the car as it passed the women, but were too far
off to hear what, if any, conversation ensued.

R. 169, 182.

Contrary to the other cases where the prostitutes actually
approached a stopped vehicle and spoke to the occupants, the
record here does not establish that anything more than a brief
exchange transpired between the passenger and the women.
Third, neither Farris nor Schow knew based on their own
knowledge that either of the women were prostitutes.
15

R. 168,

176.

Moreover, they did not articulate in their testimony that

the women were acting in any peculiar way, such as strolling
rather than walking at a normal pace or looking back at traffic
as if to seek out possible customers, which would lead them to
suspect that the crime of solicitation was in progress.
In light of Byrd and Holmes, the comparatively innocuous
events leading up to the stop of Rodriguez's car based on a
brief, passing encounter with two women, whose purpose was never
discerned, does not rise to the level of a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of solicitation such that a stop would be
appropriate in this case.

And even if the women were known

prostitutes, the mere act of slowing down to "check out" two
women, as young men are want to do, is not so unusual as to
warrant a stop of the car.
In sum, Farris and Schow did not offer a sufficient,
objective basis for the stop of Rodriguez.

Initially, they did

not establish why his slow driving to the right of the lane was
peculiar to the point that it raised a reasonable suspicion of
loss of control of the vehicle due to intoxication or a medical
condition.

In addition, they did not articulate any objective

facts, other than second-hand knowledge, why they believed the
women walking on the sidewalk were involved in prostitution or
why the sole act of sticking one's head out the window as the
truck drove by the women was sufficiently suspicious to warrant
further investigation.

Utah and federal case law does not

support such attenuations between circumstance and suspicion, but
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rather requires a more objective basis before an individual's
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
may be suspended.

Therefore, the trial court erred in finding

that reasonable suspicion existed to support the initial stop of
Rodriguez's automobile.

Consequently, the trial court erred in

denying Rodriguez's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant
to an illegal stop as fruit of the poisonous tree.
II.

The Admission of the Toxicology Report Violated
Appellant's Constitutional Right of Confrontation and
His Right to Cross-Examine Adverse Witnesses Secured
Under The Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure,
Constituting Reversible Error.

The magistrate erred in binding Rodriguez over to the trial
court based on information contained within the toxicology report
since the toxicology report constituted hearsay not within any
exception to the rules of evidence and lacked foundation which
might otherwise establish its trustworthiness.

The admission of

the report not only violated Rodriguez's statutory right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses as secured by the rules of
evidence and criminal procedure, but also violated his
constitutional right of confrontation.

Consequently, the

magistrate committed reversible constitutional error and
reversible prejudicial error since the outcome of the preliminary
hearing would have been different had the report been properly
excluded.
A.

The Rules of Evidence are Applicable to
Preliminary Hearings and are Thus Determinative of
Admissible "Reliable Hearsay".

Under the Utah Constitution, the Utah Rules of Criminal
17

Procedure, and case law, the Utah Rules of Evidence are
applicable to preliminary hearings and are thus determinative of
what is admissible, reliable hearsay.
The Utah Constitution provides for the use of reliable
hearsay at preliminary hearings, but defines "reliable hearsay"
under the terms of the evidentiary rules.

See Art. I, § 12, Utah

Const.; see also State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah
1980)(rules of evidence regarding hearsay evidence are procedural
protections of a criminal defendant's rights under Confrontation
Clause).

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution permits

"reliable hearsay" to be admitted in a preliminary hearing in
support of probable cause to bind a criminal defendant over to
the district court.

However, Article I, Section 12 also

expressly provides that reliable hearsay is admissible "as
defined

by rule

added).

or statute."

Art. I, § 12, Utah Const, (emphasis

The plain language of Article I, Section 12, therefore,

directs that the rules governing the use of hearsay are
instructive in determining "reliability" for purposes of its use
at a preliminary hearing.
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure likewise establish that
the rules of evidence, including those governing reliable
hearsay, apply at a preliminary examination.

Rule 7(h)(2), Utah

R. Crim. P. (1997), provides that a finding of probable cause at
a preliminary proceeding may be premised on hearsay evidence.
Rule 7(h)(1), Utah R. Crim. P., provides that "a preliminary
hearing shall be held under the rules and laws applicable to
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criminal cases tried before a court."

When read in conjunction,

these rules, like the Utah Constitution, mandate that the
evidentiary rules regarding the use of hearsay be applied in
determining what is "reliable", admissible hearsay at a
preliminary hearing.
In addition to the Utah Constitution and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the Rules of Evidence themselves assert their
applicability to preliminary hearings.

Rule 1101(b), Utah R.

Evid., specifically sets forth the situations in which the rules
of evidence do not apply.2

However, nothing in the language of

1101(b) indicates that the rules of evidence do not apply to a
preliminary hearing.

In fact, the only reference to preliminary

hearings concerns the fact that reliable hearsay is admissible.

Rule 1101, Utah R. Evid., provides:
(b) Rules Inapplicable.
The rules
[of
evidence] do not apply in the following
situations: (1) Preliminary questions of fact
which are to be determined under Rule 104 (a)
(see text below); (2) Grand jury proceedings;
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition,
sentencing or granting or revocation of
probation, issuance of warrants for arrest,
criminal summonses and search warrants and
proceedings with respect to release on bail or
otherwise; (4) Contempt proceedings in which
the court may act summarily;
(5) In a
preliminary examination, nothing in these
rules shall be construed to prevent the
admission of reliable hearsay evidence.
Rule 104(a), Utah R. Evid., provides:
Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary
questions concerning the qualification of a person
to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court . . . In making this determination it
is not bound by the rules of evidence.
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See Rule 1101(b)(5), Utah R. Evid.

If the drafters of the rules

intended that the rules would not apply in a preliminary
proceeding, then the language of 1101(b) would reflect this
intention as plainly as it does with regard to other stages of a
criminal proceeding.

However, the rule is noticeably silent on

this issue, indicating that it was the drafters' intent that the
rules of evidence apply to preliminary examinations.
Finally, case law reinforces the principle that the
evidentiary rules apply at a preliminary proceeding.

In State v.

Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held
that a ballistics report was admissible at a preliminary hearing
since it satisfied the rules of evidence in that the expert who
prepared the report was made available for cross-examination and
the expert's opinions were based on personal observations of the
bullets at issue.

Id. at 268-69.

The Schreuder Court expressly

premised its decision on the plain language of the evidentiary
rule governing expert testimony, noting that the "testimony was
permissible under the . . . provisions of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and . . . did not in any way infringe upon defendant's
constitutional right to be confronted by the witness against
him."

Id. (citing the then Rule 56(2), Utah R. Evid., governing

opinion testimony).
Other jurisdictions also apply the rules of evidence to
preliminary examinations, especially when determining "reliable
hearsay" for purposes of a preliminary hearing.

In People v.

Washington, 270 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. App. 1978), the Michigan Court
20

of Appeals held that an officer's testimony regarding a young
child's identification of the defendant was not admissible at a
preliminary examination since his testimony did not fall under
the "tender years" or "res gestae" exceptions to the Michigan
Rules of Evidence.

Id. at 512-13.

The Court expressly stated

that " [a]t a preliminary examination, the recognized rules of
evidence apply" since a finding of probable cause must be
premised on "legally

admissible

evidence."

Id. at 512 (emphasis

original).
The Idaho Supreme Court likewise held that an affidavit from
a medical doctor concerning the results of a DNA blood test was
not admissible at a preliminary hearing since it did not conform
to the evidentiary hearsay rule governing use of such affidavits.
See State v. Horslev, 792 P.2d 945, 951-54 (Idaho 1990).

The

Court so ruled in light of express statutory language permitting
the use of affidavits at preliminary examinations, stating that
"the report was not admissible, unless it was admissible under
I.R.E. 803(24)."

Id^ at 952.

Accord State v. Jones, 660 P.2d

965, 968-69 (Kan. 1983)(rules of evidence apply at preliminary
hearing since testimony at preliminary hearing may be used
against defendant at trial; only evidence admissible at trial may
be considered by magistrate at preliminary hearing); State v.
Massencrill, 657 P. 2d 139, 140 (rules of evidence apply at
preliminary hearing without restriction).
In light of the plain language of Article I, Section 12 of
the Utah Constitution, which provides that hearsay "as defined by
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statute or rule", as well as the language of rules 7(h) (1),
7(h)(2), and 1101(b), and case law directly stating that evidence
rules governing the use of hearsay are determinative of reliable,
admissible hearsay at preliminary hearings, the Utah Rules of
Evidence are the index of reliability for purposes of preliminary
hearings in this state.

Accordingly, under the evidentiary

rules, the toxicology report did not qualify as reliable hearsay
and was improperly admitted by the magistrate presiding over the
preliminary hearing.
B.

See Point B, infra.

The Toxicology Report Is Unreliable Hearsay Not
Included Within Any Hearsay Exception and Lacking
in Foundation Which Might Otherwise Establish Its
Reliability.

The toxicology report is unreliable hearsay which may not be
admitted at a preliminary hearing in support of probable cause3
to bind Rodriguez over to the trial court since the report does
not fall within any hearsay exception under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

The rules of evidence expressly exclude the toxicology

report as a police report under 803(8)(b).

Likewise, the

toxicology report is not included within the business records
exception as provided under 803(6).
U.S. 56, 66,

See Ohio v. Roberts, 448

100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (holding

3

In order to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the
prosecution must present sufficient competent evidence to establish
probable cause that the crime charged has been committed and that
the defendant committed it. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h) (2) (1997) . The
prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to
establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must
present a sufficient quantum of evidence to warrant submission of
the case to the trier of fact. See State v. Pledger, 896 P. 2d
1226, 1229 (Utah 1995)(citing State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783
(Utah 1980) .
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evidence which fits within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"
presumptively reliable); see also Rule 803(8)(B) and 803(6), Utah
R. Evid. (1997). Finally, the toxicology report lacks foundation
which might otherwise establish its reliability.

See State v.

Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 403 (Utah 1989).
1.

The Toxicology Report Is Inadmissible For
Lack of Foundation.

The trial court erred in admitting the toxicology report
since the State failed to adequately establish its foundation at
the preliminary hearing.

Under Rimmasch, the "inherent

reliability" of scientific testing procedures must be established
before test results may be admitted as reliable hearsay under the
rules of evidence.

Id. at 398.

In establishing the "inherent reliability" of the testing
procedures, evidence must be presented establishing the
qualifications of the crime lab employee conducting the test, as
well as the proper functioning of the testing equipment.

See

Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Utah App.
1990)(noting lack of evidence regarding training or certification
of technician administering breathalyzer test); see also Kehl v.
Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah App. 1987) (holding results
of breathalyzer inadmissible where State presented no evidence as
to functioning of test equipment or qualifications of
administrator).
At the preliminary hearing, the State did not present the
lab technician who conducted the tests, nor any evidence
concerning his or her qualifications.
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The State also failed to

present evidence regarding the methods used, and establish the
proper functioning of the testing equipment.

Notwithstanding the

noted absence of such evidence, and over the objection of
Rodriguez's counsel, R. 70, the judge erroneously concluded that
the report was admissible, stating, "[although] we don't know . .
. how [the substance] was analyzed, . . .

it still seems to me

that the constitution was amended to permit this kind of evidence
at [a] preliminary hearing."

R. 70-71.

Contrary to the Court's conclusion, however, the
admissibility of reliable hearsay at a preliminary proceeding
does not dismiss the need to establish its foundation in the
first place.

Indeed, reports, such as the toxicology report at

issue here, are reliable by virtue of the trustworthiness of the
methods and qualifications of technicians producing the results
indicated in those reports.

A proper foundation regarding the

testing procedures and the technician's qualifications is
essential to a determination that test result are reliable.

See

Roosevelt City v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah App.
1991)("[w]hile there is a presumption of reliability that permits
admission of . . . test results . . . there is no presumption
that the test results are, in fact, accurate")(emphasis
original).

Hence, in the absence of any evidence concerning the

"inherent reliability" of the qualifications of the crime lab
employee testing the contents of the baggie or establishing the
accuracy of the procedures and equipment employed, the trial
court erred in admitting the toxicology report where the state
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failed to establish its foundation.
2.

The Toxicology Report Is Not A Business
Record Within the Meaning of 803(6) .

The toxicology report does not fall within the business
record exception to the hearsay rule such that it would be
presumptively reliable and thus admissible at the preliminary
hearing.

See Rule 803(6), Utah R. Evid. (1997); see also

Roberts. 448 U.S. at 66(hearsay admissible if within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception).

Rule 803(6) establishes records kept

in the regular course of business activity as admissible hearsay.
Rule 803(6), Utah R. Evid. (1997).

However, the Second Circuit

Court of Appeals held that a similar United States Customs'
chemist report, indicating that a substance seized from the
defendant was heroine, did not qualify as a business record under
the identical federal rule 803(6).
560 F.2d 45, 75 (C.A.2 1977).

See United States v. Oates,

That Court reasoned that admission

of such "evaluative reports" would jeopardize a criminal
defendant's confrontation rights.

Id. at 78.

Although the question presented in Oates has not been
addressed directly in Utah, the Utah Supreme Court nonetheless
provided clear guidelines for admitting police reports as
business records under State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah
1983).

The Bertul Court held a police report inadmissible since

there was not a clear showing of foundation.

Id. at 1184.

Based

on the language of Rule 803(6), Utah R. Evid., Bertul outlines
the foundation requirements for a document generated by the
police department to qualify as presumptively reliable under the
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business record exception.
The foundation should generally include the following:
(1) the record must be made in the regular course of
the business or entity which keeps the records; (2) the
record must have been made at the time of, or in close
proximity to, the occurrence of the act, condition or
event recorded; (3) the evidence must support a
conclusion that after recordation the document was kept
under circumstances that would preserve its integrity;
and (4) the sources of the information from which the
entry was made and the circumstances of the preparation
of the document were such as to indicate its
trustworthiness.
Id.
The Bertul court held that police reports "made for the
purpose of successfully prosecuting a crime" are inadmissible
since the circumstances of their preparation "raise a serious
question of reliability."

Id.; see also Peronek, 803 P.2d at

1297 (holding admission of jail incident report at probation
revocation hearing violated defendant's confrontation rights).
"[T]he reasons which might otherwise provide a basis to assume
reliability of such reports as business records do not exist
where police reports are offered by the prosecution in a criminal
proceeding."

Id.

As a report prepared in anticipation of prosecuting the case
against Rodriguez, the toxicology report at issue here is
similarly excluded as a business record under Bertul.

The

extraordinary nature of this particular toxicology report is
highlighted by the fact that neither of the officers knew, based
on experience alone, that the white substance found on Rodriguez
was cocaine, and therefore required the toxicology report in this
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specific instance to initiate proceedings against Rodriguez.4
Moreover, the crime lab's statutory mandate is to prepare such
reports "for criminal prosecution" based on analyses of "evidence
form crime scenes."

Utah Code Ann. 53-5-104(5).

Given the

prosecutorial purpose of the toxicology report, the report fails
the first Bertul requirement that the report be made as a routine
matter.

Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184.

The toxicology report also fails to satisfy the third and
fourth Bertul requirements in that the State did not establish
that the baggie and its contents, the subject of the report, were
"kept under circumstances that would preserve its integrity", and
that "the sources of information from which the entry was made
and the circumstances of the preparation of the [report] were
such as to indicate its trustworthiness."

Id.

In order to admit

a business record into evidence, a foundation must be laid by
"the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness."
Rule 803(6).

"Where the evidence has passed through several

hands, circumstances surrounding the chain of possession are
relevant in making this assessment."

State v. Bradshaw, 680 P.2d

1036, 1039 (Utah 1984) .
In the case of the baggie seized from Rodriguez, there is
dispute as to who was in possession of it from the time it was
seized until the time it was entered into evidence at the jail.

4

At the preliminary hearing, the Court sustained Defendant's
objection to the state's question of Officer Schow, which asked
whether, based on his experience, he could identify the substance
as cocaine. R. 62-63.
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R. 53.

Officer Farris, the officer who first saw the baggie and

took it from Rodriguez's person, was out of town during the
preliminary hearing and unable to testify as to the baggie's
disposition.

Id.

Consequently, the Court relied upon the

testimony of Officer Schow, who testified that he accompanied
Farris to the jail where it was entered, but who admitted that he
could not "say for sure" whether Farris kept the baggie with him
at all times, or even whether he himself took the baggie at any
point.

R. 63.

In Peronek, this Court noted that although

another "qualified witness" may introduce a business record, an
officer who was "twice-removed" from the preparation of the
report in that case, and who had no other "custodial
responsibility" to ensure the report's accuracy, was not
qualified to "lay a foundation."

Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298.

Likewise in this case, the testimony of Schow as to an absent
officer's handling of the evidence found on Rodriguez is
insufficient to establish the chain of custody necessary to
ensure the Court of its proper handling, and hence, its
reliability.

Consequently, the Court erroneously accepted

Schow's testimony as sufficient evidence in support of the chain
of custody.
Even if Schow's testimony did adequately establish the chain
of custody of the baggie up until it's booking into evidence at
the jail, the State still failed to establish the chain of
custody once the baggie was in the possession of the Crime Lab,
as well as the accuracy of the methods and equipment used in
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determining its contents.

Beyond the bare fact that the baggie

was delivered to the Crime Lab by the usual delivery person,the
State did not present any evidence concerning its disposition
after this point.

(R. 68-69)

Moreover, the State did not

establish the "inherent reliability" of the testing procedure,
namely the qualifications of the Crime Lab technician who
ultimately tested the baggie's contents and the accuracy of the
methods and the testing equipment employed.

See Point B.l,

supra; see also Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398.

For example, the

State did not put the criminologist on the stand who administered
the tests of the substance, nor offer any testimony regarding the
testing procedures.

In the absence of such testimony, the

toxicology report does not qualify as an admissible business
record under Bertul.

The lack of evidence concerning the chain

of custody of the baggie while in possession of the Crime Lab, as
well as the lack of evidence concerning the "inherent
reliability" of the circumstances surrounding the testing of its
contents do not establish the accuracy of the results such that
the report would be admissible.
In sum, the absence of Farris, the only officer with firsthand knowledge of the disposition of the baggie, the uncertainty
of Schow as to even its general disposition, and the complete
absence of testimony as to its handling at the Crime Lab amount
to a break in the chain of custody beyond a mere weak link going
to the weight of evidence.
(Utah App. 1988).

See State v. Wvnia, 754 P.2d 667, 671

Rather, this ambiguity leaves open a
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substantial possibility that at some point the contents of the
baggie were tampered with or altered.

Id.

("circumstances

surrounding the custody . . . and the likelihood of tampering are
factors to be considered in determining [] admissibility.)5
Given this probability, which goes directly to the reliability of
the toxicology report, the court erred in admitting it as
reliable hearsay in support of a finding of probable cause at the
preliminary hearing.
3.

The Toxicology Report Is Expressly Excluded
As A Police Report Under 803(8)(B).

Even if the toxicology report qualified as admissible
hearsay under the business record exception, the report would
nonetheless be excluded as a police report pursuant to Rule
803(8)(B) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

That rule provides that

public records prepared in the routine course of a public agency,
pursuant to a duty imposed by law, are admissible

however,
and other

in criminal
law

cases matters

enforcement

personnel."

observed

by police

"excluding,

officers

Rule 803(8)(B), Utah R.

Evid. (1997) (emphasis added) .
This Court reviewed the applicability of 803(8)(B) to a jail
incident report in Peronek, holding the report to be inadmissible

5

Although Wynia held that custody of marijuana evidence was
established where it was placed in the "hands of the state," and
was thus presumed to have been "handled with regularity, " that case
is distinguishable from the instant case. Wynia, 754 P.2d at 671.
In the present case, the State did not put the criminologist on the
stand who tested the substance in the baggie, whereas in Wynia,
that criminologist did testify and the only weak link in the
custody chain was the absence of the crime lab employee who
initially accepted the evidence from the officers. Id.
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hearsay.

Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298.

The Court stated that the

report was inadmissible hearsay under 803(8) (B)

since it "did

not materially differ from a crime report or other investigatory
report expected to lead to some form of prosecutorial action."
Id. (citing Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184); see, e.g., United States
v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 67 (holding chemist report prepared by
United States Customs as inadmissible hearsay expressly excluded
by the police record exception under federal rule 803(8) (B) on
basis that admission would violate defendant's confrontation
rights).
Likewise, the toxicology report at issue here was "not
prepared in the regular course of jail administration."

Id.

Rather, this report was made solely in anticipation of building a
criminal case against Rodriguez.

See Point B.2, supra.

The non-

routine nature of the toxicology report is underscored by the
fact that the test was necessary to identify the substance in the
baggie in order to establish probable cause to believe Rodriguez
was guilty of possession as charged by the State; neither of the
police officers present when the baggie and its contents were
seized could positively identify the substance as cocaine based
on their experience alone, and that the report was the only
conclusive evidence to that effect.
The fact that the report was prepared by an employee of the
state crime lab does not shield it from the police report
exclusion.

Rule 803(8) (B) extends the exclusion to include

reports generated by "other law enforcement personnel."
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The

crime lab is an instrumentality of the police department,
instituted for the purpose of "analyz[ing] evidence from crime
scenes and crime-related incidents for
Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-104(5) (1994).

criminal

prosecution."

Consequently, the state

crime lab employee who prepared the report is properly
characterized as "law enforcement personnel" for purposes of this
rule.

See Oates, 560 F.2d at 67-68 (characterizing chemists of

the United States Customs Service "law enforcement personnel" for
purposes of Federal Rule 803(8)(B)).

Thus, as a report prepared

for the sole purpose of prosecuting the case against Rodriguez,
generated by "law enforcement personnel" as proscribed under Rule
803(8)(B), the toxicology report is expressly excluded as a
police report under the Utah rules of evidence.
C.

The Admission of the Toxicology Report Violated
Defendant's Rights of Confrontation and CrossExamination.

Even if the rules of evidence are not determinative of
"reliable hearsay" for purposes of a preliminary hearing, the
admission of the toxicology report nonetheless violated

I
Rodriguez's constitutional right of confrontation and his
statutory right to cross-examine the witnesses against him at the
preliminary hearing.
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that a criminal
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation attaches at a
preliminary hearing.

Anderson, 612 P.2d at 785 (citing Art. I, §

12, Utah Constitution); see, e.g., Oates, 560 F.2d at 68-69
(holding that admission of chemist's report, where chemist did
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not testify, violated defendant's confrontation rights).

The

Anderson Court noted that a preliminary examination is an
"adversarial proceeding in which certain procedural safeguards
are . . . necessary to guarantee the accused's substantive right
to a fair hearing."

Id.

With particular emphasis on the

discovery which takes place at this stage of a criminal
proceeding, the Court noted:
the preliminary hearing represents an important step in
the preparation of the defendant's defense for the
subsequent trial. The opportunity to prepare an
effective defense is recognized as essential to the
preservation of the defendant's substantive right to a
fair trial. Thus, . . . effectuation of the ancillary
purposes of the preliminary hearing mandates the
application of certain procedural safeguards to the
hearing itself.
Id. at 784.
A criminal defendant also has the statutory right to "crossexamine adverse witnesses" at a preliminary hearing.

Rule

7(h) (1), Utah R. Crim. P. (1997) . As explained by the Anderson
Court, the "procedural right of cross-examination" is
"encompassed in [the] right of confrontation" and serves to
"prevent depositions and ex parte affidavits from being used
against the accused at trial in lieu of personal examination and
cross-examination."

Anderson, 612 P.2d at 785.

"The application

of the right of cross-examination, and the exclusion of certain
out of court statements at this stage of the criminal prosecution
insures essential protection of the defendant's substantive
rights."

Id.

Based on the foregoing, the Anderson Court held that an
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affidavit containing the sworn testimony of a material witness at
a preliminary hearing was inadmissible hearsay since its
admission would violate the defendant's right of confrontation.
Id. at 786.

"If the preliminary examination is to retain any

meaningful significance in the criminal prosecution . . . , the
protections attendant the defendant's right to present an
affirmative defense cannot be circumvented by allowing the
prosecution to base its showing of probable cause on [an extra
judicum statement]."

Id.

The Anderson decision is still good law in light of the
recent Article I, § 12 amendment ("amendment"), which permits
reliable hearsay to be admitted at preliminary hearings.

At

most, the amendment curtails a criminal defendant's right to
confrontation, but does not abolish the right altogether to the
extent that defendants are heretofore subject accusation by
unsworn ex parte statements.

In the context of sentencing

proceedings, the Utah Supreme Court stated that although evidence
which would be inadmissible at trial is admissible at a
sentencing hearing, "[t]his does not mean . . . that there is no
requirement that the evidence presented . . . be reliable. . . .
The due process clause of the United States and Utah
Constitutions 'requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably
reliable and relevant information.'"

State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d

1064, 1072 (Utah 1993)(quoting State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118
(Utah 1985)); accord California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct.
1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (fact that hearsay exceptions may
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limit scope of protections under Confrontation Clause does not
infer that "core values" must no longer be satisfied).
Likewise, the same minimum level of reliability must remain
in place in order to satisfy a defendant's confrontation rights
at the preliminary hearing.

As noted by the United States

Supreme Court in Green, the remaining "core values" of the
Confrontation Clause, namely that the declarant testifies and
that defendant has opportunity for cross-examination, remain
intact even where the rules of evidence provide for the admission
of hearsay.

See Green, 399 U.S. at 158 ("Confrontation Clause is

not violated by [hearsay statements] as long as the declarant is
testifying . . . and subject to full and effective crossexamination") ; see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66 (Confrontation
Clause requires that evidence presented at a preliminary hearing
bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness").
The practical consequence of the amendment on Rodriguez's
confrontation rights, therefore, is that hearsay may be admitted
against him at the preliminary hearing, but that hearsay must
nonetheless satisfy the "core values" of the Confrontation
Clause.

Hence, the report cannot be offered against Rodriguez

unless it was at least prepared under oath or the preparer
testifies and is made available for cross-examination.

See

Green, 3 99 U.S. at 156-57 (although hearsay evidence may be
admitted against a defendant in contravention of confrontation
rights, hearsay must satisfy "core values" of the right in that
the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination); see
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also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1072 (due process under the Utah and
United States constitutions "'requires that a sentencing judge
act on reasonably reliable and relevant information'")(citation
omitted).
However, the toxicology report at issue in this case does
not meet even the minimum guarantee of reliability to protect
Rodriguez's Confrontation Clause rights.

As in Anderson, the

State did not present the person who prepared the testimony and,
therefore, Rodriguez was denied the opportunity to confront that
witness.

In fact, the toxicology report is more unreliable than

the sworn affidavit at issue in Anderson since this report was
not sworn testimony.

Moreover, the State did not provide any

evidence as to the report's preparation.

Specifically, the State

did not offer testimony regarding the qualifications of the
person who tested the substance, the conditions of the lab and
testing equipment, or the chain of custody from the time it was
entered into evidence at the jail to the time the report was
made.

See Point B.1-B.3, supra; see, e.g., Johnson, 856 P.2d at

1072 (psychological report held inadmissible at sentencing
hearing since it contained double and triple hearsay which was
"so inherently unreliable and present Led] [] a high probability
for inaccuracy").

Yet, despite the complete absence of any

indicia of reliability, the magistrate accepted the report into
evidence.
The admission of the report denied Rodriguez's right to
confront and cross-examine the witness against him at the
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preliminary hearing.

Since the person who prepared the report,

an unsworn document alleging that the substance found on his
person was cocaine, was not made available at the preliminary
hearing, and since the report did not qualify as a hearsay
exception under the rules of evidence nor bear other indicia of
reliability, the trial court erroneously admitted the report in
violation of Rodriguez's statutory and constitutional rights,
thereby denying him a fair hearing and trial throughout the
proceeding against him.
D.

See Anderson, 612 P.2d at 786.

The Admission of the Toxicology Report Constitutes
Reversible Error.
1.

Admission of the Toxicology Report Amounted to
Constitutional Reversible Error.

The admission of the toxicology report violated Rodriguez's
constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses at a
preliminary hearing, and therefore amounts to reversible
constitutional error.

Where "the error in question amounts to a

violation of a defendant's right of confrontation . . ., its
harmlessness is to be judged by a higher standard, i.e., reversal
is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987) (citing

Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23
L.Ed.2d 284 (1969)); see also State v. Villareal, 889 P.2d 419,
425 (Utah 1995) .

The factors to be considered regarding whether

a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
include:
the importance of the witness' testimony in the
prosecution's case, whether the testimony was
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cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of crossexamination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the
overall strength of the prosecution's case.
Id. (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct.
1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674

(1986)).

Under this standard, the admission of the toxicology report
amounted to reversible error.

The report was essential to the

State's allegation that Rodriguez was guilty of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance in violation of Utah Code
Annotated, 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Without the report, the State could
not otherwise establish probable cause that Rodriguez was guilty.
The incriminating statements made by Rodriguez, identifying
the substance as cocaine, did not bolster the State's case at the
preliminary hearing since the statements were admitted in
violation of the corpus delicti rule and should not have been
considered, standing alone, as evidence that Rodriguez was
guilty.

The corpus delicti rule provides that "before a

defendant's inculpatory statements can be introduced as evidence
against the defendant, the [prosecution] must prove the
occurrence of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

State v.

Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1992); see also Provo City
Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah App. 1993).

In the

case

at bar, the State offered Rodriguez's statements when the only
other evidence before the judge was that a baggie containing a
white substance was found on Rodriguez's person, which was not
enough to establish probable cause.
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Consequently, Rodriguez's

statements were improperly offered in support of probable cause
since the State had not yet established the corpus delicti by
other competent and permissible evidence.
Even if the State presented the balance of its remaining
evidence prior to the introduction of Rodriguez's statement, the
State's case still would fall short of establishing the corpus
delicti of the crime.

For example, The testimony offered by

Officer Schow asserting that the substance was "consistent" with
cocaine did not establish probable cause to bind the case over
for trial.

The State itself defined the scope and import of

Schow's testimony as a mere statement of what the substance
"might be", "could possibly be", rather than a "categorical []"
statement of what it was.

(R. 63)

The fact that Schow's

statement was speculative is highlighted by the fact that he
admitted that at times he mistakenly identified baking soda for
cocaine in other cases.

(R. 64)

In addition, the State failed

to establish Schow's qualifications to make his assessment.

(R.

62) (trial court sustained Rodriguez's objection to Show's
identification of the substance based on his experience for lack
of foundation).

Given the speculative nature of Schow's

testimony, his statement alone did not establish probable cause
at the preliminary hearing.
Since Rodriguez's statement was not permissibly considered
in the probable cause determination, and since Schow's
speculative statement falls short of establishing probable cause,
the toxicology report was the only evidence upon which a finding
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of probable cause could have been found at the preliminary
hearing.

Given that the report was inadmissible as unreliable

hearsay, the court did not commit simple harmless error in
binding Rodriguez over on the charge of possession of a
controlled substance based solely on the report's contents.
Rather, the violation of Rodriguez's rights of confrontation
constitute reversible constitutional error beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Rodriguez's conviction should be overturned accordingly.
2.

Admission of the Toxicology Report Was Prejudicial
and the Outcome of the Preliminary Hearing Would
Have Been Different If the Report Had Been
Properly Excluded.

Even if Rodriguez's confrontation rights were not violated,
the admission of the unreliable report in contravention of the
rules of evidence nonetheless constitutes reversible error since
the outcome of the preliminary hearing would have been different
if the toxicology report had been properly excluded.

" [T]he

standard for dealing with non-constitutional error is that [the
court] will not reverse a conviction unless the error is
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a
more favorable result for the defendant."

State v. Strausberg,

895 P.2d 831, 833 (Utah App. 1995).
In the present case, the toxicology report was the only
evidence establishing the State's charge that Rodriguez was
guilty of possession.

See, Point D.I., supra.

The other

evidence that the State presented at the preliminary hearing,
namely the speculative testimony of Schow that the substance in
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the baggie was "consistent with" cocaine, and Rodriguez's
identifying statement, which was improperly admitted in violation
of the corpus delicti rule, did not adequately establish the
level of probable cause necessary to bind Rodriguez over to the
trial court on the possession charge.

Id.

Consequently, had the

toxicology report been properly excluded as mandated by the rules
of evidence, then Rodriguez would not have been bound over on the
possession charge for lack of probable cause.

Since there is a

reasonable likelihood, therefore, that "there would have been a
more favorable result [if the report had been excluded]", the
admission of the report amounted to reversible error.
Strausbercr, 895 P. 2d at 833.

Hence, Rodriguez's conviction on

this charge should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Rodriguez respectfully requests this
court to overturn his conviction based on the district court's
erroneous dismissal of his motion to quash bindover and motion to
suppress evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search of his
person and vehicle.
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